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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
other person, firm, corporation or association of persons, any
article of merchandise, produce or commodity."
In Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co.19 a contract
requiring one of the parties to market through the other all of the
output of propane-butane gas from its Pampa, Texas, plant was
held not to violate this Act. The court reasoned that the contract
covered only the Pampa plant and left the producer free to bar-
gain with other marketing agencies for production from its other
plants. The reasoning of the decision follows Cox, Inc. v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co.20 and Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Jones Invest.
ment Co.2 Where exclusive selling agreements cover only a place
of production or of use, and not the contracting parties themselves,
the contract will not be found to violate the Act.
William Johnson Davis.
REAL PROPERTY
TENANCY By ENTIRETY-CONVEYANCE By HUSBAND To
HIMSELF AND WIFE
Arkansas. In Ebrite v. Brookhyser1 a husband conveyed land
from himself to his wife and himself as tenants by the entirety. A
tenancy by entirety is essentially a form of joint tenancy, modified
by the common law theory that the husband and wife are one per-
son. Thus, it resembles a joint tenancy in its incident of survivor-
ship. It differs from joint tenancy in that neither the husband nor
the wife can partition or alienate an interest in the property with-
out the consent of the other. Essential to the creation of the estate
at common law are the four unities of interest, time, title, and
possession!
19 .__.........Tex .......... ,243 S  W. 2d 823 (1951).
20 16 S. W. 2d 285 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
21 65 S. W. 2d 495 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
1 ---------- Ark_____ 244 S.W. 2d 625 (1951).
2 26 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife, § 66.
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When the husband died intestate, his brother and sister brought
suit to set aside the deed on the grounds that an estate by entirety
could not be created except when the title came to the husband
and wife by deed from a third person and that the essential unity
of time was lacking since the wife did not acquire her interest at
the same time as the half interest retained by her husband. In
deciding the first contention the Arkansas Supreme Court was
called upon to determine whether a statute' providing that a deed
executed by a married man directly to his wife shall be construed
as conveying "the interest specified in the deed" was applicable.
The court upheld the conveyance for the following reasons: (1)
the statute permits a husband to create a tenancy by the entirety
by a conveyance to himself and his wife, and (2) the unity of time
was not lacking because the husband conveyed not to himself, but
to a legal entity composed of husband and wife. The Arkansas
Supreme Court thus aligned itself with the modern view that a con.
veyance intended to create a tenancy by entirety will be upheld
even though some of the technical requirements for the creation of
that estate are lacking.
This modem view of allowing the parties to do directly what
they could undoubtedly do indirectly through the device of a straw
man appears to be logical and just. It gives each spouse absolute
freedom in dealing with separately owned property, and this free-
dom entails no interruption of the unity arising from marriage.
For the court to construe the conveyance otherwise would be a
judicial conveyance of the property contrary to the owner's ex.
pressed intention."
ASSIGNMENT VERSUS SUBLEASE
Arkansas. In Jaber v. Miller5 Jaber rented a building for a five-
year term with a provision that the lease would terminate if the
3 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 50-413.
4 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 432.
A -.......... Ark ............ 239 S. W. 2d 760 (1951).
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premises were destroyed by fire. Later the lease was transferred
for the remainder of the term by mesne conveyances to Miller by
an instrument of transfer entitled "Contract and Assignment",
which did not contain a provision governing the rights of the
parties in case the building was destroyed by fire. Miller executed
a series of notes to divide payment into monthly installments and
also agreed to pay the owners of the property the stipulated rental.
Jaber reserved the right to retake possession if Miller failed to
pay the rent or the notes. When the premises burned, Miller
brought suit for the cancellation of his notes for the monthly in-
stallments, and the Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with the
question whether the instrument of transfer from Jaber to Miller
was an assignment or a sublease. The important practical differ-
ence is that a sublessee is not considered the legal equivalent of an
assignee and is neither bound by nor entitled to enforce, the cove-
nants and conditions in the head lease. s
In holding that the transfer was an assignment, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, in order to avoid the harsh results of the tradi-
tional common law view, adopted the principle that the intention
of the parties is to govern in determining whether an instrument
is an assignment or a sublease.
The majority of the American jurisdictions follow the simple
common law view: if the instrument purports to transfer the
lessee's estate for the entire remainder of the term, it is an assign-
ment, regardless of its form or of the parties' intention. Con-
versely, if the instrument purports to transfer the lessee's estate
for less than the entire term--even for a day less-it is a sub-
lease, regardless of its form or of the parties' intention.7 The
Arkansas court felt that this common law doctrine was supportable
for a lawyer trained in common law technicalities but refused to
follow it because for the less skilled lawyer or for the layman it is
6 1 TIFFANY, R.AL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 124.
7 Ferrier, Can There be a Sublease for the Entire Unexpired Portion of a Term? 18
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1929).
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a trap that leads to injustice by thwarting the result sought by the
parties.
Arkansas also refused to align itself with the minority of Ameri-
can courts,' including Texas,9 which have gone as far as possible,
in order to soften the harshness of the common law rule, to find
something that might be said to constitute a reversion where the
parties intended a sublease. These jurisdictions hold that if the sub-
lessor reserves a right of re-entry for non-payment of rent, this is
a sufficient reversionary estate to make the instrument a sublease.
Although this view is based on the erroneous theory that such a
right of re-entry is a reversionary interest whereas at common law
a right of re-entry was a mere chose in action, the commendable
feature of these decisions lies in their effort to find some basis for
effectuating the parties' intention.
The Arkansas view seems the most rational, for there seems to
be nothing in legal theory to justify the requirement that a sublease
should be of less duration than the head lease. Since the funda-
mental distinction between assignment and sublease should be
recognized, the category into which a particular transfer is to be
placed should depend not upon the existence of a technical rever-
sion in point of time but upon the intention of the parties to the
transfer.1"
ADVERSE POSSESSION - PROOF OF HOSTILE CLAIM
Texas. Gilbert v. Green" was an action in trespass to try title to
regain possession under a record title. Plaintiff's predecessor in
title, Gilbert, and defendant's predecessor in title, Parsons, came
into possession through a family partition of adjoining unfenced
tracts of land. Gilbert fenced in his cattle in such a way as to per-
mit Parson's cattle to graze over a portion of Gilbert's land; that
portion was the tract in dispute. Parsons neither cultivated nor
8 Massachusetts, Montana, and California.
9 Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912).
10 Ferrier, op. cit. supra note 7 at 19.
11 -------..--- Tex ............. 242 S. W . 2d 879 (1951).
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made improvements on such portion. The description in the deed
to defendant included only the land Parsons had under record
title, but defendant purchased under the impression that he was
acquiring the land in dispute; and Parsons did nothing to correct
this impression. The defendant claimed the tract by adverse pos-
session under the ten-year statute of limitation by reason of Par-
sons' use of the land for more than ten years.
In Texas, in order to constitute adverse possession which results
in obtaining title to real property, the possession must be actual,
visible, continuous, and hostile.12 Here the controlling question
faced by the Texas Supreme Court was whether Parsons asserted
an adverse and hostile claim of ownership against Gilbert while
using the land in dispute. Parsons testified he had never asserted
such a claim, although he had used the land for more than ten
years. Defendant contended this use raised a presumption of hos-
tile and adverse possession.
Generally, where title to real property is in issue, present pos-
session alone is prima facie evidence of the possessor's ownership,
the presumption merely shifting to the opponent the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to the contrary.' The Texas Supreme Court ad-
mitted that possession under the ten-year statute has been held to
raise a presumption that it was adverse and hostile in the absence
of evidence to the contrary qualifying and explaining the posses-
sion, but said the proof establishing the possession must itself be
consistent with a hostile claim of ownership in order to support
such a presumption.' 4 The court said that allowing possession under
the limitation statutes to create a presumption of ownership is de-
ceptive, since the adverse possessor has the burden of offering
proof of a hostile claim, and it is better to say that the same evi-
dence can be used to prove both possession and a hostile claim of
ownership if the evidence is susceptible of such treatment.
The court sustained the plaintiff's claim for the following rea-
12 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5515.
13 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 69.
14 Hartman v. Huntington, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 130, 32 S. W. 562 (1895).
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